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TIHv^IOST important single factor in the development of cur-
rent nationalism in Asia was the World War. This in turn was
lafgely due'to the, harsh pressure of the imperialistic policies of the
Great Powers upon the East. These Great Powers themselves were
responsible for lefti'ng loose the forces that resulted in the organiza-
tion of the' new' nationalistic states with their earnest zeal and fei'vor'.
During the Middle Ages Asia was the aggressor against Europe':
the Arabs in Spain and Sicily, the Mongols in Russia, and the
Turks in the Balkans and Hungary. This was not without its value
for European culture, particularly because of the great importance
of the Arab learning in the development of the Western Renaissance.
Since the early part of the nineteenth century European nations
have ]:teen the aggressors against Asia. Western ideas and methods
have been scattered throughout the East by statesmen, merchants,
missionaries, teachers, and travelers. There were a few who, in their
ignorance, professed to believe that the East was an area that would
resist all change. But most people in their hearts had the idea that
something would happen as a result of the great outpouring of West-
ern influence in Eastern lands. Had this not been the case, certainly
we would have been driven to the conclusion that there was some-
thing the matter with the ideas as they worked, or did not work,
upon the East. But now that they are "taking." many profess to be
surprised that something is actually happening. And Eastern peo-
ples are driving this thing called Nationalism through to its logical
conclusion.
,-.
For the sake of definiteness it will be well to indicate what we
include in the Near East. Geographically speaking it is the area
that was under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire at the be-
ginning of the nineteenth century. This includes the Balkan penin-
sula south of the Danube River, Roumania, the islands in and the
lands bordering the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, Asia Minor, and
the Arab-speaking lands of Western Asia. With the exception of
the Christian States in the Balkans and the Lebanon in Syria, this
area is inhabited predominantly by people who embrace the Moslem
faith. The struggle for nationality among the Balkan States has in
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the main come to an end, although there are still disputes due to the
mixture of populations.
It is in the Moslem Near East that nationalism has had the most
astonishing development in the last decade and a half. Only ahout a
generation ago Vamhery wrote that "religion ahsorhs the intellect
of the Asiatic; it is stronger than his feeling of nationality." That
statement needs revision today, so fast has the supposedly unchang-
ing East changed. Political liberty preceded by some time the de-
mands for social liberty in the West. The reason why Eastern na-
tionalism now seems to be moving at such a rapid tempo is because
it is hop-step-and-jumping the political, religious and social at once.
These peoples want sovereignty and independence as complete as that
possessed by any of the Western States.
In his important treatise on International Law, "The Law of Na-
tions," the Swiss writer Vattel commented upon the freedom, inde-
pendence and equality of nations, and how they judged according to
their own consciences. The apparent eifect of this, to quote from
Vattel. was to produce, "a perfect equality of rights between na-
tions, in the administration of their affairs, and the pursuit of their
pretensions, without regard to the intrinsic justice of their conduct,
of which others have no right to form a definitive judgment; so that
what is permitted in one, is also permitted in the other, and they
ought to be considered in human society as having an equal right."
That has been doctrine dear to the Western nations, and Eastern
nationalism has developed the same enthusiastic affection for it.
But it should be observed that Eastern nationalism has appeared
when nationalism in the West has to a large degree lost its reason
for being. There was something of a noble moral enthusiasm and
conviction in the Western nationalism of the century before the
Great W"ar. It undertook to liberate peoples and to combat injustice.
To Mazzini, one of the greatest of the liberal nationalists, there was
chiefly unselfishness in this ideal. It was the purpose of life "not to
possess more or less of happiness but to make ourselves and others
better." Nationalism had a duty to fulfil to mankind, to aid civiliza-
tion and cultures. So far as the Western Powers are concerned, na-
tionalism has had its fling, and its positive values have been reaped.
The peculiar characteristics of the different national cultures may
be retained, and the values of national boundaries for administrative
purposes will long be seen. But the economic and cultural justifica-
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tion for many of our national frontiers has largely passed. The
nationalism of the last decade or two in the West has heen chiefly
negative, concerned with hostility for the foreigners, attacks upon
the minorities within the gates, and attempts to develop a false eco-
nomic self-sufficiency which has to he proj^ped up hy wasteful means.
To have a real and peculiar affection for one's homeland is not only
proper Init inevitable, l)Ut this should not necessarily presuppose a
hostility for the neighboring lands. It is quite apt to be an inferi(jr-
ity complex that leads some countries, especially some of the new
nationalisms of the Near East, to fear the presence of other nation-
alities in their midst.
There are surely some areas, both East and West, where present
movements can be explained on the basis of the inspired liberal na-
tionalism of the earlier decades. When the Chinese seek to defend
themselves against the plundering of their territory by military and
aggressive nationalisms, that seems to justify a valid national enthu-
siasm. That is also the case with the Turks when thev are fired
with national vigor to defend valiantly the heart and center of the
old Ottoman Empire, and preserve what is unquestionably their own.
The very words of Mazzini cry out against the efforts that have been
made to Italianize the people of the Austrian Tyrol. There is much
more valid reason for the currency and tide of nationalism in the
Moslem Near East at the present time, than there is for its contin-
ued artificial stimulation in the well-established countries of the
Western world. For some time the Eastern lands may stand to gain
from their nationalist thought and feeling, provided it is reasonably
restrained and tempered with justice. They are justified in their
nationalist fervor as long as it helps to preserve a national culture.
The new Near Eastern nationalisms may be urged to learn from the
A\'est what the Western nations have not been able themselves to see
clearl\- ; namely, that when nationalism has patriotically aided in
obtaining the organization and security of the State and the devel-
opment of its culture, it should exercise care not to condemn in others
what it approves in itself, should not outlast its usefulness by nega-
tive and destructive pur])oses, but should be a refining influence
among the nations.
No part of the Moslem Near East has failed to respond to the
stimulus of modern nationalism, but the result of this response has
varied greatly in the diff'erent sections, whether viewed from the
success or failure of a movement t<i secure national independence, or
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the degree to which a community has become modernized. '. The
magic slogan of "self-determination" was a siren call to which these
peoples gave ready heed. They all had definite grievances which
cotild" have -'been -righted years earlier had it not been for the greedy
imperialism of the Great Powers. It was the feeling of having been
restrained and unjustly treated for long years that led the Arabic
and Turkish peoples to embrace nationalism with such avidity. It
became a force the strength of which many leaders did not realize.
They have been carried along,by this ferment of nationalistic feeling
not knowing just where it was taking them, and. not risking to stem
the tide at times for fear that they would lose their power.
In this new day when the Orient has been again awakened, con-
flicting motives appear to be urging them. They are anti-Western
i-n the sense that they sacrifice and struggle to throw off the political
control of the Western States, but at the same time, with one or two
exceptions, they eagerly strive to become as nearly like Europe as
possible. Fortunately these Moslem States do not appear to be in-
terested in slavishly copying the West, but in trying to adapt West-
efn methods. and techniques 'to. suit their ends. This is especially true
in those fields which the Easterner believes have contributed to the
material power and prestige of Western civilization. Social and re-
ligious influences from the West are not nearly as acceptable as are
the evidences of organizational and scientific advance. This is nat-
ural because the East has ever excelled in- the contemplative and
peaceful^ rather thari' in 'the-material and the mechanical.
Turkey has been the most successful State in the Moslem Near
East in its efforts to throw off foreign control and develop a mod-
ernized Maational country: iqHeri leaders have 'been more quick to
adapt themselves to and understand the meaning of the changes
necessary in her life. -No other people has followed insistent leader-
ship so readily in throwing .overboard almost everything Oriental
and breaking with the most ^eep-rooted traditions of the past. It
has been suggested that this wjas probably easier than in the case of
Arab lands, because there wa§ less of an indigenous Turkish civil-
ization from whichto- break away. There were earlier attempts in
the time of the Ottoman Empire to reform the State, but they were
superficial and did not. strikeiat the root of the 'problem. Islam pre-
supposed a theocratic State, dn'lwhich religion was the source of law
and order, and this was not 'consonant with the modern nationalist
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State. The despotic sultan, Abdul Hamid II, feared nationalism as
the forerunner of a worse evil, democracy. He sought to strengthen
his own position at home and threaten the European countries as
well by Pan-Islam, a movement to unite all the Moslems under the
influence of the Sultan-Caliph at Constantinople, as the present city
of Istanbul was then called. The Young Turks overthrew Abdul
Hamid II in 1909, and proclaimed a new nationalism based upon
fraternity of all the peoples of the Empire. They failed sadly be-
cause they were unwilling or unable to develop a just nationalist
movement that would satisfy the non-Turkish elements. They yielded
to the fatal idea that national cultures should be suppressed and not
nurtured. Only a decentralized state based upon a recognition of
the' needs of the different cultural groups in the country could have
developed Ottoman unity, and then staved off the ravages of West-
ern imperialism against the Turkish Empire.
Those ravages were real indeed, although it was the ineptitude and
misgovernment of the Ottoman Sultans, as the present Turkish lead-
ers themselves now state, that were in large part responsible for the
encroachment of the West. On the other hand the European Powers
were not interested in helping the Sultanate to be strengthened and
improved, but rather in pushing it down so that they could partici-
pate in the inevitable distribution of the spoils. In the last two or
three centuries the Ottoman Empire lost territory in every succeed-
ing generation, and in the long reign of Abdul Hamid II, the Turk-
ish- State became -entangled in a maze of. enforced concessions and
financial loans to European interests, that constituted virtual eco-
nomic enslavement. This process was facilitated by the capitulations,
or extraterritorial rights, that granted foreigners in the land special
privileges. These had originally been voluntarily given by the Sul-
tan to certain foreign states, but in the days of Ottoman decline and
weakness had been- twisted by the Powers into instruments of unfair
advantage for- themselves. At the end of the Great War no state
was seemingh- at such a low ebb as the remnant of the Ottoman Em-
pire. With its capital, Constantinople, in control of the Allies, the
Sultan's representatives were told to sign the severe Treaty of Sev-
res. Meanwhile the- W^estern Powers authorized the Greeks to oc-
cupy Smyrna and its "hinterland iii western Asia Minor on a tem-
porary basis, but 'the Turks feared that' this was the beginning of
the end of their own control over this fair western part of what
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they regarded as an historical homeland. A sweeping nationalist
movement, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, an able
military commander, flared up in Asia Minor, and rapidly carried
all before it.
Aroused by a dual hostility to Greek nationalism and British im-
perialism, the Turkish struggle was remarkably successful. In Janu-
ary, 1920, a brief National Pact that had earlier been accepted by the
nationalist Assembly at Angora was adopted at the last meeting which
the Turkish Parliament ever held in Constantinople. The Pact
was a succinct and reasonable statement of the "maximum of sacri-
fice."' which the Turkish people would be willing to make as a guar-
antee for their national independence. Its principles became the ba-
sis of the negotiations that resulted in the Treaty of Lausanne be-
tween Turkey and the Western Powers in 1923. This Declaration
of Independence, as the Pact may be called, presupposed the con-
tinuance of the Ottoman Sultanate, and demanded the recognition
of an independent Turkey, consisting of those lands that contained
an Ottoman Moslem majority, free from foreign yoke and the capit-
ulatorv restrictions. If there was any sense in which the Lausanne
Treaty was an imposed treaty, it was imposed by the Turks upon
the Allies, for practically all the terms of the National Pact were
fulfilled.
The nationalists soon overthrew the Sultan and established a
Republic and then ousted the Caliph because the}' wished to make
sure of no hindrance in organizing a completely secular and lay
State. The leaders wished their people to press on quickly to mod-
ern life, by which they meant a Western mentality. To reject the
Asiatic and virtually transplant the institutions of the West to Asia
Minor became almost a passion. It was a case of adopting European
tools with which to make permanent the newly gained freedom from
Luro])ean control. Gradualness was a word foi'eign to the vocabu-
lary of the Turkish nationalist. Following the abolition of the ca-
pitulations, the Sultanate and the Caliphate, there came in rapid suc-
cession a series of religious, social, cultural, and legal reforms which
thoroughly altered the very foundations of Turkish traditions and
life. If there are principles or practices of modern nationalism,
whether valid or questionable, which the people are slow to accept,
it is not l)ecause the leaders have not furnished an insistent example.
The national compactness of the population has contributed to the
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success of the movement. The country is inhabited almost exclu-
sively by Moslem Turks, except in Istanbul, where there are some
Christian minorities and Jews, and in Eastern Anatolia, where there
are still Kurds who have not yet been settled in other parts of Asia
Minor by the Government. The keynotes of Kemalism have been
to consolidate the Turkish elements in the state, to throw oft" foreign
influence and control, and to construct in Turkey an independent,
modern nation. Whatever has come down from the past that seemed
to block those aims, has been rigorously discarded ; whatever there
is in the present that would appear to further those aims, has been
speedily accepted. In this respect no modern ruler has been more
consistent, more purposeful, or more thorough than Mustafa Kemal
Pasha, whose new name is Ghazi Kemal Ata Tiirk.
In the new Turkey, the nation replaced religion in the State.
The heterogeneous Ottoman Em])ire had developed a system in which
religious feeling was the expression of nationality; with the practi-
cally homogeneous population in the Turkish Republic, national sol-
idarity took the place of religious feeling. It was significant that
the Sultanate was overturned before the Caliphate. The former af-
fected Turkey only, but the latter the entire Moslem world, at least
supposedly. Is there anything which shows the driving force of
this nationalist feeling so conclusively as that in 1924 it accomplished
in a twinkling the overthrow of the Caliph of Islam as if he were
but a mere subaltern, when a decade liefore the Caliph had been
seriously regarded as a world-power, who could array the hosts of
Islam in battle against the Western Allies ? The Turkish Constitu-
tion of 1924 declared, "The religion of the Turkish State is Islam,"
but this Article was removed from the Constitution four years later.
Some have declared that the Turkish leaders were l^ent upon repudi-
ating Islam in favor of atheism, but there is hardly confirmation for
this belief. It is sufficient to suppose that they wished to leave no
doubt about the lay character of the State. The Government has not
neglected the services in the mosques, which are carried on in the
Turkish language and not in the Arabic of the original Koran. For
the people this brings distinct advantages. There are Turkish lead-
ers who l)elieve that the new relationship between religion and the
State will give new vitality to Islam, and that Turkey will act as a
guide for other Moslem lands to follow. There does not seem to be,
however, any sufficient source, or training school, from which the
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Turkish religious leadership of the future will come. There is a
law against religious propaganda, and legally there is religious free-
dom for all adults. Religious equality does not exist, and there has
been practically no increase in the true spirit of religious tolerance
toward non-Moslem faiths during the period of the Republic. In
these respects, however, the new Turkey is probably not far behind
some other nations, whose cultures are supposed to have been more
highly advanced for a long period of time.
The nationalist Government is organized with all the forms of a
modern republican State. The franchise is still very narrow, and
wisely so, because the percentage of illiteracy is high in the land,
despite the great progress that has been made since the adoption of
the Latin characters for the language. Political leaders in the land
declare their earnest support of democracy, but believe that the new
forms of their government can be filled with content only after the
people become better educated and able to use them. Organized po-
litical opposition is not tolerated, and there is only one political party
in the country, the People's Party. It has a relationship to the
Government similar to that in other states, which are dominated by
the single-party system. The names of candidates for election to
the Grand National Assembly are submitted to the President of the
Republic, who chooses a certain number from among them, and the
deputies are chosen from his list. The courage and earnestness of
the leaders has been noteworthy, and with the continuance of these
virtues, progress in the nation may be conditioned only by their
ability and wisdom.
The Turks are probably no more instinctively anti- foreign than
are other people. Having smarted for so long under the real in-
justices of foreign subordination, they were inclined at first to be-
lieve that the foreigner was responsible for all, instead of only a
part, of their ills. To them it is axiomatic that whatever other na-
tions are entitled to do, they are entitled to also, both as a matter of
right and prestige. This is nicely illustrated in the case of the Egyp-
tian capitulations. Turkey had complained bitterly, and with jus-
tice, that the capitulations were unfair and worked unjust hardship
upon her. After she had freed herself from the onus of the capitu-
lations, however, Turkey demanded that Eg3'pt should grant her
capitulatory privileges in that country as long as other foreign pow-
ers had them
!
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The Turkish attitude toward foreigners and foreign influence is
colored by the fact that this period of trying to substitute new values
for radically different old values is critical for the leaders. Because
of the character of their past experiences, they want to control the
foreign assistance which they secure. The Turkish Government has
employed many foreign experts, and in general finds this method
satisfactory, for they can "hire and fire" the expert according to the
terms of a definite contract. The Turkish authorities are becoming
increasingly suspicious, if not intolerant, of foreign institutions in
the country, which parallel institutions which they have, or may have
in the future, whether the institutions are schools, hospitals, banks,
or establishments of more modest scope. There are many Turks who
recognize the values, comparative and otherwise, of the foreign in-
stitutions, but they cannot wield a commensurate amount of influ-
ence at this time.
Like the other nationalisms, particularly the new ones of this
day, the Turkish is complete, sweeping and thoroughgoing. It
presses on to a logical conclusion, even if the results appear at times
to show contradictions. The progress that the Turkish Republic
has made was clearly shown when the completion of the first decade
of its existence was celebrated in October, 1933. In her domestic
concerns, the great task of putting "on modern foundations the
bonds of social life, of giving a new ideal and a new direction to
society," as one of the Turkish intellectuals has expressed it, has
been carried on with substantial progress ; in foreign policy, the
Turkish statesmen have shown great wisdom, especially in the work
of conciliation in the Balkans. That Turkey should take her effec-
tive place among the modern nations not only in name, but in spirit
as well, is of great importance.
During the long years of domination by the Ottoman Empire,
the Arabs had been stirred by nationalist feeling. Islam was the
religion of both Arabs and Turks, but they had widely varying
conceptions of this religion. ]^\irthermore the Arabs believed that
theirs was a culture and a civilization far superior to that of their
political overlords. In 1905 an Arab National Committee had urged
the union of all Arab tribes, under a liberal monarchy with an Arab
as Sultan. The Ottomanization policy of the Young Turks after
1908 helped fan the flames of Arab nationalism. Arabs hoped that
the World War would bring a federal union of Arab countries and
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a return of ancient glory. But these hopes for union were hlasted
due to secret agreements and treaties made hy the AlHes which con-
flicted with promises that had been made to the Arabs.
Arab nationalism had first developed thus as a protest against
the authority of the Turks, but since the Great War it has been fired
by hostility to Western control, and a stern belief that France and
Great Britain did not play fair by them in establisihing administra-
tions, which, according to a promise made by these two Powers as
late as November, 1918, would derive "their authority from the ini-
tiative and free choice of the indigenous populations." There were
two currents in Arab nationalism, in each of which the religious
strain was felt dififerently. The Bedouins of the desert, especially
the Wahhabites, were deeply stirred by religious feeling. In the
towns the Arabs had been more exposed to the political and other
influences from Europe, with the result that they were more opposed
to Turkish domination. With the townsmen the enthusiasm for
their religion rated second to political influences in the development
of nationalism, and with them Arabs of differing religions could co-
operate better together.
Syria was the first Arab land to feel the surge of modern nation-
alism. It was particularly exposed to outside influences, notably the
French. Just before the World War the policies of the Young Turks
stirred the Syrian consciousness deeply, and the different races and
religions in that country felt a more common bond in their Arabic
speech. Earlier religious hatreds came to be displaced by political
and social interests that developed a common nationality. After it
became clear in the early part of 1919. that a confederation of the
Arab States would not be formed, the Syrian nationalists at least
hoped for a united Syria. They opposed being put under a mandate,
and aimed at a constitutional monarchy with Emir Feisal at the
head. Such a plan was disallowed by the Allied statesmen, who
awarded to France the mandate for Syria, despite the expressed
opposition of the people. In assuming the mandate, the French ig-
nored the fact that a rather strong national consciousness had de-
veloped in recent years and was beginning to overcome sectional and
religious differences. The mandate was organized under several
separate units, the French justifying this division on the ground of
administrative necessity and religious differences.
From the very beginning the French have had trouble with their
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Syrian mandate. The High Commissioners were changed frequent-
ly, and with one or two exceptions they have not been men of abihty
sut^cient to cope with the situation. They have been accused of
treating the country as a backward colony, instead of a Class A
mandate. The most serious trouble was a rebellion of the Druses
in 1925 as a result of which the great city of Damascus was bom-
barded by the French forces and a large area was ruined. The
Lebanon, with its predominantly Christian population, was pro-
claimed a Republic in 1926. and this has not smoothed the problem
of attaining a united Syria. The Syrians wish to establish a treaty
relationship with France similar to that arranged between Great Brit-
ain and Irak, but the negotiations to this end carried on by the
French with the Syrian Parliament at Damascus have repeatedly
failed. The country has been pacified at great expense in money
and wounded feelings, but discontent is strong because of the denial
of real independence and the continued division of the country. \\'ith
patience and restraint on the part of the Syrians and more wisdom
and better administrators on the part of the French, time should
correct most of the grievances of the nationalists and also stimulate
the French to substitute for the mandate a treaty that will honor-
ably guard the interests of all. Even then the question of the status
of the Lebanon will be a special problem. If Syria were onlv more
prosperous, the French might be having an easier time.
As to Irak, or Mesopotamia, the Allied secret agreements had
provided that Xorthern Mesopotamia should be a part of a projected
post-war Arab State, and that the Southern part should be under
British protection. The nationalism of the Irakis was expecting a
Kingdom of Mesopotamia, as declared at a 1920 Congress in Da-
mascus. Instead the San Remo Conference awarded Irak to Great
Britain as a Class A mandate. A revolt followed this news and
the mandate never actually came into legal existence, but was super-
seded by an Anglo-Irak Treaty. An Arab monarchy was estab-
lished with the Emir Feisal, who had just been overthrown by the
French as King of Syria, as King of Irak. With Arab nationalism
in the ascendant, the Irakis at once began to agitate violently and
otherwise for complete independence. Different treaties were nego-
tiatd, but they were unsatisfactory to the nationalists because thev
resembled a mandate. League of Nations obligations made it neces-
sary for Great Britain to insist on exercising certain international
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and financial controls, that clashed \vith the Irak ideas of indepen-
dence, (jrcat Britain promised to recommend Irak for admission to
the League of Nations as soon as sufficient progress toward pre-
paredness for independence had been made.
The im]:iatience of the nationalists for Great Britain to fix "the
time" was extreme, and at times led them into indiscreet action. As
criteria for independence, the British stated that there must he sta-
ble government, settled frontiers, and "a sincere intention to fulfill"
international obligations. In 1929 Great Britain announced that Irak
would be recommended for League membership in 1932. In the
first case of its kind to arise, the League of Nations studied the
question of the fitness of Irak for independence, and. chiefly because
of the British recommendation, admitted this Arab State to the
League in 1932. Irak was required to subscri]:)e to certain guaran-
tees. This change in the status of Irak was of international impor-
tance. To the Iraki it meant the culmination of their nationalist
struggle, and they expressed the hope that other Arab States would
not be much longer delayed in their admission to the League.
After the W^orld War only the kingdom of Hejaz was organ-
ized as an independent Arabian State. Including the Holy Places
of Islam. Mecca and Medina, this was the heart of Arabia. British
support gave the throne to the Emir LIussein, Sherif of Mecca, who
dreamt of an Arab Federation. His sons, Feisal and Abdullah,
were rulers over Irak and Transjordan respectively, and this gave
a familv or ]:>ersonal union to three Arab States. When the Turk-
ish Republic overthrew the Caliph, King Hussein believed that the
keeper of the Holy Places of Islam was a natural successor to the
Caliphate, and that this office would also aid him in shaping Arabian
political unitv. He thus assumed the title of Caliph. Hussein's
plans failed chiefly because the powerful Moslem leaders in Egypt
did not sup])ort him. and because his neighbor and enemy. Ibn Saoud,
the strongest man in Arabia, now attacked and defeated him. King
Hitssein abdicated in favor of another son, Ali. but by the beginning
of 1926, Ibn Saoud, Sultan of Nejd, had seized control of the
Hejaz. Since 1932 the combined Hejaz and Nejd has been called
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saoud has continued his con-
C|uests, has recently concjuered the Imam Yahya of the Yemen, and
has brought still nearer the union of the Arab tribes.
In Arabia proper nationalism is of a different stamp than in the
CURRENT XATIOXALISM IX THE MOSLEM XEAR EAST 119
other Aral) states that have lieen mentioned. The commnnities are
more primiti\-e, and the i^ersonal dictation of a dominant chieftain,
snch as Ihn Saoud. determines its character for the time. As chief
of the \\'ahhal)i sect, Ihn Saond speaks for the most pnritanical and
fanatically nnitarian Moslem sect in the Near East. It is theocracy
complete with the orders of the day hased on the laws of the Koran.
But Ihn Saoud is a wise and powerful ruler, the most astute of the
Arabs. The ]M-ece])ts of religion and the traditions handed down
must be observed, but likewise there are relationships that must be
carried on with the foreigners, and with the other Arab states. Rigid
though the ^Foslem world is sometimes claimed to be, it has discrim-
inating and successful ways of change that tend to progress. Ihn
Saoud is seeking to consolidate his immediate authority over pvAC-
tically all Arabia proper. He has declared himself as hopeful for a
Federation of the Arab states, a grouping which he promises to sup-
port, and also as a believer in Pan-Aralnsm. This Cromwell of
Arabia is not yet old, and he may take many steps toward the head-
shij) of a united Pan-Arab world.
Egvptian nationalism has lieen a clear-cut struggle against British
imperialism. The English have often declared that the Egyptians
would l)e trained through liberalism to independence, but to the im-
patient Egyptian nationalist it was taking far too long. Earge num-
bers of the people experienced real prosperity, but prosperity was not
political independence. Years before the Great War, the Egyptians
had made demands for constitutional government with tlie high ol^ces
in their own hands, for a greater ditTusion of education and with
more emphasis upon the .Arabic, and for a prohibition u,pon the grant
of concession.s to foreigners. These demands were riiade at a time
when the sovereigntv of the Ottoman Sultan still held over Egypt,
but when years of British administration had given security and
excellent administration to the countr)-. The English declared a pro-
tectorate over Egypt, when Turkey joined the German Powers in
1914. The example of tlic Arab world, the doctrine of self-determi-
nation, and opposition to foreign rule urged Egyptian nationalism
onward during and after the Great War. The most outstanding and
tuicompromising nationalist leader in I\gypt was Zaghlul Pasha.
The struggle between the British and the Egyptians during the
last two decades has been bitter and at times violent. The Egyptian
demands moved from autoiK)my to complete independence. Egyp-
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tian independence was declared in 1922. and the Sullan became King,
but there was a field of authority which the British insisted on main-
taining, and this has caused trouble. Egypt has insisted on its need
of possessing the Sudan in order to control the Nile waters, but such
political possession is denied by the British. The Egyptians
wish to wave farewell to all British troops, but England maintains
that the defense of the British Empire depends upon the security
and control of the Suez Canal, for which purpose adequate troops
must be stationed there. The abolition of the capitulations and the
complete control of her internal affairs are nationalist demands, which
the British have been seeking earnestly to adjust. The safety of
British imperial communications also involves supervision of Egyp-
tian foreign relations. These difficult reserved questions, as they
have been called, have occasioned many conferences, much heat, and
serious misunderstandings. As long as Great Britain has extensive
Eastern interests, it will be necessary to harmonize, or integrate,
Egyptian independence with British policies. This is very certain
as long as international affairs remain so crudely organized that a
completely independent Egypt, unable to defend itself might be over-
run and conquered by another Power. This problem is an example
of how cordial cooperation between an Eastern and a Western state
might become a pattern for others to follow. The success of the
attempt is still for the future to determine.
At the end of the World War, Great Britain was granted a man-
date over Palestine and TransJordan. The same High Commis-
sioner serves both areas, but it is provided that Transjordan and
Palestine should be separately administered. The Arabs are opposed
to having the provisions of the Palestine mandate concerning the
Jewish National Home apply to the country across the Jordan, for
they do not wish to chance the opening up of this land to Jewish
immigration. Transjordan is a valuable link in the chain for the
protection of Britain's eastern interests. The fiction of constitu-
tional rule is maintained by King Abdullah in agreement with the
mandatory Power. Transjordania is dependent upon British advice,
financial and military assistance. Nationalism is present and raises
its voice from time to time, but it is still too definitely connected with
British policies to be bothersome or embarrassing to the controlling
foreign Power. The same can hardly be said about the situation in
the historic country west of the Jordan River.
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The problem of Palestine is clearly that of reconciling two dif-
fering nationalities, bitterly opposed to each other, to living together
in a small country in reasonable peace and security. The land has a
predominantly Arab population, almost three-quarters, the Jews have
both religious and political attachments there, and to the Christians
it is an object of special interest and concern. The British Balfour
Declaration of 1917, later approved by France, Italy, and the United
States, promised a National Home for the Jewish people in Palestine,
on the understanding that this did not "prejudice the civil and re-
ligious rights of existing non-Jewish communities." The purpose
of the League mandate given to Great Britain was declared to be to
train the people of Palestine for self-government and to establish a
Jewish National Home.
Despite the fact that Palestine has had High Commissioners of
remarkable ability, the story of the mandate is an account of passive
or violent resistance on the part of the Arabs, and complaints and
frequent dissatisfaction on the part of the Jews. The Arabs have
feared the entrance of so many Jewish immigrants that their own
people would lose their numerical superiority ; the Jews have com-
plained that the annual immigration quotas for their people were in-
sufficient for the economic development of the land. Aral)s have
declared that the Balfour Declaration makes impossible the normal
development of self-governing institutions as implied in the League
mandate ; the Jews have charged the Arabs with carrying out a policy
of obstruction against the mandatory Power. Placed squarely be-
tween these two zealous and rival nationalisms, the British Govern-
ment has been in an unenviable position. The mandatory has de-
clared that Palestine cannot become "as Jewish as England is Eng-
lish. "" that Jewish nationality will not be imposed on all Palestine,
and that the Jewish National Home is to develop along with, and
not to the exclusion of, the Arabs.
The Arabs are unconvinced. The Jews have the great advan-
tage of tremendous financial assistance from the Western world.
In 1929, the Jewish Agency was reorganized so that Zionists and
non-Zionist organizations could assist in establishing the National
Home. Zionist agricultural developments have expanded greatly,
and much land has been purchased by Jews from Arabs. These have
all been voluntary sales at good prices, but the Arab nationalists re-
sent this exchange of land, feeling that with each sale a part of the
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country itself is passing from their control. The Aral)s have pos-
sessed the land for many years, but it is undenial)le that under the
new dispensation the Jews in Palestine have rights guaranteed by
international promises. It is generally admitted that new Jewish
immigrants should be peasants or manual workers. Tel-Aviv is a
remarkable tribute to Jewish industry, faith, and vision, but Pales-
tine cannot support many such cities, or absorb unlimited numbers
of the professional classes and "white-collar" devotees.
The Arabs came to their "Philistia" and the Jews to their "Land
of Israel" as conquerors, centuries ago, the latter having preceded
the former in the land. But for the purposes of todav and the
future, both peoples should emphasize less the possession of the
past and turn to the indispensable cooperation necessary for the
present. Jewish enthusiasm and the development of special projects
in Palestine, such as the splendid new port at Haifa, the Jordan
Hydro-Electric Works, and the exploitation of the Dead Sea Salts
Concession, largely accoimt for recent material progress in spite of
all the nationalist disturbances. This progress is beginning to affect
the standard of living of the Arabs, and hence their social life. It
seems axiomatic that for a contented Palestine it is necessary that
the Arabs comprehend that self-governing institutions can be se-
cured only through cooperation with the Jews, and that the Jews
realize that they cannot by unlimited immigration become a ma-
jority in the land, Init rather that the "Land of Israel" should be to
them a great center for the renewal and restoration of what is finest
in their cultural and religious life. British policy is seeking to build
a bi-national State in which two nationalities living side bv side have
absolutely equal rights and privileges. It is to be questioned if there
is, or ever has been, a more difficult place in which to bring such an
experiment to a successful reality. Truly has someone said that
Great Britain will deserve well of the world, if in the Holy Land
there is developed a firm Palestinian nationality of "awakened Arab
and home-loving Jew."
It is thus seen that the easily explainable struggle of the Arabs
to secure the realization of their nationalistic aims and ambitions
has left the Arab AVorld at the present time in an exceedingly un-
happy state. The problem is insoluble to the satisfaction of the
great majority as long as at least two conditions remain. The first
condition is the continuance of foreign imperialistic policies which
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ha\e been rcsponsilile for keeping the Aral) \\"i)rld divided into a
large numljer of units. The second is the lack of union among the
Arabs themselves and the common character of current nationalism
which often makes it almost brutally careless of the rights of others.
But grant the absence of these conditions, with the result that Aral)
union or federation developed in some form, even then it is quite
probable that for an unknown number of years Great Britain would
need to remain in a special relationship to Palestine and France to
the Lebanon.
Life in the n]idst of the current nationalisius of the AI(jslem Xear
Last does bring one face to face with certain stern facts, the appre-
ciation of which might help both East and AA'est. The bitter and
suspicious attitude which the struggle for national satisfaction
aroused among these Xear Eastern peoples has been due to the
harsh ex]^erience which they had in exploitation bv the imperialist
Powers. There is much in our Western life which is unworthv for
the Ea>tern States to copy, but in seeking to use nationalism with
which to combat A\'estern control, or assert authority over others,
they have used not only its worthy elements, but also the same kind
of technique, which, when applied toward them, they haxe described
as unfair and intolerable. The success of nationalist movements in
the Xear I^ast has been varied but still remarkablv rapid since the
Great \\'ar, and these new nationalisms should in ]>atience and re-
straint realize that \\'estern institutions, v.diich they are seeking to
copy or adapt, developed only through sacrifice and long experience,
and did not come full-blown.
Bitt the Western Powers must realize the necessitv of freeing
the awakened Xear I-'.ast from imperialistic j^ressure. The excuse
for continued control on the ground that these peoples are not
capable of self-government is Ijecoming palj^ably unjustifiable. Li
view of the lack of success that democratic self-gDvernment has been
experiencing in large areas of the Western world, it borders on
hypocrisy and self-conceit to ]:)rejudge too dogmatically the capacity
of others in this respect. (In that basis of equality i>f judgment and
treatment of which both East and West stand much in need, we
should not at this present hour regard the sheeplike support of a
single leader, or of a few. a proof of incapacity for self-gxnernment.
Li reconciling the demands of modern nationalism with the injunc-
tions and spirit of Islam, the ^Moslem communities have shown
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that they can be sufficiently ingenious and adjustable, but probably
no more so than have been the Christian communities in their atti-
tude toward imperialism and militarism. Present-day nationalism
in the Near East has no virtues, and probably no vices, which can-
not be found in the nationalism of the West. Ovir patience and help
should be extended to those who are seeking to build the new nation-
states of the Near East. Our sympathy must consider the fact that
this building has been taking place at a time when their leaders did
not have the finest period of Western nationalism to serve as a
model and when they were too urgently pressed to study the history
of the past, so that it could serve as a guide.
It is said that Iraki leaders once told Gertrude Lowthian Bell in
the early years of the British control of that country that liberty as
between nations is never given, but is always taken. In stating
some of his views to Ameen Rihani, the puritan Ibn Saoud declared
that the Germans merely expressed the views of all Europe in their
estimate that treaties were mere "scraps of paper," and that the
Arab rulers should take care not to imitate the European Powers
in this respect. If the Moslem Near East at times displays the child-
ish qualities of supersensitiveness to criticism and a kind of petu-
lance, the West needs to study its own past and quash any mani-
festations of superiority.
